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Abstract Tsunami-evacuation planning in coastal communities is typically based on
maximum evacuation zones for a single scenario or a composite of sources; however, this
approach may over-evacuate a community and overly disrupt the local economy and strain
emergency-service resources. To minimize the potential for future over-evacuations,
multiple evacuation zones based on arrival time and inundation extent are being developed
for California coastal communities. We use the coastal city of Alameda, California (USA),
as a case study to explore population and evacuation implications associated with multiple
tsunami-evacuation zones. We use geospatial analyses to estimate the number and type of
people in each tsunami-evacuation zone and anisotropic pedestrian evacuation models to
estimate pedestrian travel time out of each zone. Results demonstrate that there are tens of
thousands of individuals in tsunami-evacuation zones on the two main islands of Alameda,
but they will likely have sufficient time to evacuate before wave arrival. Quality of life
could be impacted by the high number of government offices, schools, day-care centers,
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at one identified safe area after an evacuation. Multi-jurisdictional evacuation planning
may be warranted, given that many at-risk individuals may need to evacuate to neighboring
jurisdictions. The use of maximum evacuation zones for local tsunami sources may be
warranted given the limited amount of available time to confidently recommend smaller
zones which would result in fewer evacuees; however, this approach may also result in
over-evacuation and the incorrect perception that successful evacuations are unlikely.
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1 Introduction
Tsunami-evacuation planning is challenging in coastal communities due to varying wave
arrival times and inundation associated with local and distant tsunami. In many cases,
emergency managers will have the difficult job of deciding the magnitude and logistics of
an actual evacuation without complete knowledge of the characteristics of an imminent
tsunami. They also have the conflicting objectives of encouraging as many people as
possible in low-lying areas to evacuate before wave arrival to minimize injuries and loss of
life, while also attempting to minimize over-evacuations that may disrupt the local
economy, exhaust emergency services, and erode public trust in warning messages (Na-
tional Research Council 2011; Bernard 2005; Wilson and Miller 2014; Ministry of Civil
Defense and Emergency Management 2008).
The range of potential tsunami scenarios in coastal communities has led emergency
managers to take different approaches in the development of tsunami-evacuation maps.
Some jurisdictions use a maximum tsunami hazard zone from a specific scenario (e.g.,
Butler 2014; Walsh et al. 2000) or from a composite of multiple sources (e.g., Wilson et al.
2010; California Department of Conservation 2015), both to simplify the public-education
message and to maximize the likelihood that they have considered everyone who could be
directly impacted by a tsunami. Other jurisdictions, such as the State of Oregon (USA),
display two zones on evacuation maps to distinguish local tsunami evacuations where
immediate action is necessary if ground shaking is felt (e.g., from a Cascadia subduction
zone earthquake in the case of coastal Oregon) and distant tsunami evacuations that will be
facilitated by public officials over longer time periods (Priest et al. 2016).
In addition to maximum and local versus distant tsunami-evacuation maps, a third
approach to evacuation mapping is the use of multiple evacuation zones that can be
implemented during a tsunami event depending on the expected inundation extent and
arrival time of the tsunami in specific coastal areas. One example of this approach is
tsunami-evacuation maps in New Zealand that have three zones depending on tsunami
severity (Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Management 2008). Another example
is the tsunami-evacuation ‘‘playbook’’ approach being implemented jointly by the Cali-
fornia Geological Survey (CGS) and the California Office of Emergency Services (Cal
OES). Although evacuations are currently based on a maximum tsunami hazard zone that
is a compilation of multiple tsunami sources (Wilson et al. 2010; California Department of
Conservation 2015), playbooks for California coastal communities are being developed
that contain multiple evacuation zones based on modeled tsunami scenarios, their expected
arrival time, and estimated water elevations (e.g., Wilson and Miller 2014).
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Evacuation planning based on tsunami severity during an event is in its infancy in the
USA, but detailed and accurate forecast information from the Tsunami Warning Centers
provides a good foundation for this approach. To implement real-time evacuations, sub-
stantial preparedness and logistical planning still needs to be addressed. For example,
California Evacuation Playbook zones are based on discussions with local managers about
the characteristics of potential tsunami sources, including extent of inundation and wave
arrival time, but are not influenced by the number or type of evacuees for a specific zone.
This additional information could help provide community context for the evacuation
decision making by emergency managers.
The objective of this paper is to examine the population implications for coastal
communities associated with various evacuation zones described within California Tsu-
nami Evacuation Playbooks. This case study provides insight on the development and
implementation of multiple tsunami-evacuation zones, not only in California where
playbook development is ongoing, but in other coastal jurisdictions throughout the world
that are considering similar evacuation maps and procedures. Our case study focuses on the
City of Alameda, California, where multiple local and distant tsunami threats exist (Wilson
et al. 2010) and previous tsunami exposure studies have estimated substantial differences
in population exposure when comparing scenarios versus maximum hazard zones (Wood
et al. 2013a; b). First, we use geospatial analysis to estimate the number and type of people
in each tsunami-evacuation playbook zone. Second, we model evacuation potential in
terms of travel time out of each zone for these at-risk populations using an anisotropic
geospatial approach based on path distance algorithms. Third, we compare estimated
evacuation travel times to expected tsunami arrival times that determine playbook zone
recommendations and discuss the implications of this work on tsunami-evacuation plan-
ning. Evacuation travel-time maps and population exposure estimates resulting from this
process will help emergency managers appreciate the implications of deciding when to
evacuate one zone versus others, as well as target populations in areas of their city that
could have challenges reaching safety during future tsunamis.
2 Study area
The City of Alameda, California (population 73,063; US Census Bureau 2014a), is a series
of islands (Alameda, Bay Farm, and Coast Guard Islands) located along the eastern shore
of San Francisco Bay (Fig. 1). Alameda Island contains approximately 80 % of city res-
idents, the majority of commerce, and all government offices (except for US Coast Guard
offices on Coast Guard Island). The western side of Alameda Island known as Alameda
Point includes the decommissioned Alameda Naval Air Station (NAS), consisting largely
of paved runways currently used for special events but are slated for development in the
near future (Alameda Point Info 2016). Alameda Island’s south shore includes Robert W.
Crown Memorial State Beach, docks serving the USS Hornet Aircraft Carrier Museum,
and two small recreational marinas. Alameda Island’s north shore has several large
recreation boating marinas and a ferry terminal dock. Coast Guard Island is an artificial
island located off of the northeast shore of Alameda Island, is connected via a bridge to
Oakland, and contains several US Coast Guard facilities. Bay Farm Island is actually a
peninsula and is primarily developed with single-family residences and high occupancy
apartment complexes, with a large commercial complex on the south side, a ferry terminal
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on the west side, and a golf course on the east side of the island. Oakland International
Airport is east of Bay Farm Island and separates it from the mainland (Fig. 1).
The City of Alameda and other California coastal communities are susceptible to tsu-
namis generated by both local and distant earthquake sources (Wilson and Miller 2014). A
maximum tsunami inundation zone derived from composites of potential distant and local
sources has been mapped for all coastal California jurisdictions (Wilson et al. 2010;
California Department of Conservation 2015). Wood et al. (2013a) estimate that there are
approximately 39,515 Alameda residents in the maximum tsunami hazard zone, which is
the highest residential exposure for one city to tsunami hazards in California. Another
report that summarizes population exposure for a tsunami scenario associated with an
Aleutian–Alaska subduction zone earthquake includes estimates of only 3332 Alameda
residents in that specific zone (Wood et al. 2013b). This difference in population exposure
highlights the potential issue of over-evacuations when maximum hazard zones are used in
all evacuation situations, instead of smaller, more accurate zones which may better reflect
the actual threat of inundation from a specific event.
3 Methods
To examine population implications of various tsunami-evacuation zones in Alameda, we
used geographic information system (GIS) software and various geospatial evacuation,
demographic, and land cover data to estimate population distributions and model pedes-
trian evacuation potential movement out of evacuation zones to safe, high ground. We
discuss here the various data and methods required to compile such estimates.
3.1 Tsunami-evacuation playbook zones for Alameda
To provide options for evacuation planning to emergency planners in California, CGS and















































Fig. 1 Map of the City of Alameda (California, USA) various islands and noteworthy locations and
features
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include multiple evacuation zones (referred to as phases in Wilson and Miller 2014) based
on tsunami scenarios of varying inundation potential (Fig. 1) (Wilson and Miller 2014).
Playbook development was motivated by the inconsistency in evacuations statewide during
the tsunami ‘‘Warning’’ in California for the 2011 Japan tsunami. The city of Crescent City
and several unincorporated communities implemented full evacuations to their Maximum
Zones, in accordance with existing local tsunami protocols for almost all California
communities that called for Maximum Zone evacuations for all Warning-level tsunamis.
However, public-safety officials in many other communities along the California coast did
not call for residential evacuations. Decisions not to evacuate were motivated by forecasts
from the National Tsunami Warning Center (NTWC) that expected tsunami water ele-
vations along the California coast would be small to moderate in size (1.0–2.5 m) and that
tidal conditions during the first several hours of tsunami activity would be relatively low.
NTWC representatives discussed these forecasts and any updates during several confer-
ence calls with coastal counties and communities after the initial earthquake in Japan.
Therefore, while coastal communities were provided the same information regarding
imminent tsunami threats, different evacuation decisions were made locally based on
individual interpretations and risk tolerance of this information, and not based on any
formal decision-making process (Wilson and Miller 2014). The tsunami playbook is an
attempt to improve local decision making and standardize response activities for coastal
emergency managers by providing recommendations on minimum areas to evacuate based
on the size and location of a specific tsunami threat.
The decision as to which playbook zone to evacuate during a tsunami evacuation is
ultimately up to the local emergency managers, but the evacuation playbooks include a
process to help with this decision. First, communities obtain basic earthquake and tsunami
forecast information from the National Tsunami Warning Center, regional National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Forecast offices, and/or the
State as to the magnitude, source location, and travel time of the tsunami. If the tsunami is
triggered by a local or regional source, such as the Cascadia or Alaska subduction zones
which have expected arrival times of less than 4 h to reach Alameda, then a preset,
scenario-based evacuation plan is recommended for use. In most cases, an evacuation of
the playbook Maximum Zone will likely be implemented for these local or regional events
to reduce confusion and limit delays in decision making.
If the expected tsunami wave arrival time is more than 4 h after initial ground shaking,
the secondary playbook evacuation zone plans can be implemented. To help determine
which phase evacuation zone to use, the State and NOAA Weather Forecast offices will
calculate the expected tsunami flood elevation, referred to as the ‘‘FASTER’’ value that
integrates: Forecasted Amplitude (wave height); storm Surge or existing ocean conditions;
maximum Tidal height during the first 5 h of tsunami); forecast Error potential (assumed to
be 30 % based on an analysis of 2010–2011 events); and a site-amplified Run-up potential
determined from existing modeling, which is unique to each location and is applied if
inundation is expected (Wilson and Miller 2014). The State and NOAA then use the
resulting FASTER water elevation value to select and recommend the appropriate tsunami
playbook evacuation zone for each community. These results are sent to all the commu-
nities in real time and are recommended as a ‘‘minimum’’ for response and evacuation.
The City of Alameda has four playbook evacuation zones (1, 2, 3, and Maximum),
which are described in greater detail in Wilson and Miller (2015). Areas in evacuation
zones closer to the water are included in the larger zones; for example, individuals in Zone
2 would be included in the evacuation when a Zone 3 evacuation is implemented (Fig. 1).
Zones can be grouped primarily by wave arrival time, in that Zones 1–3 are encouraged for
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distant tsunamis with wave arrival times greater than 4 h, and the Maximum Zone is
encouraged for distant and local tsunamis with arrival times less than 4 h. Distinctions
among zones 1–3 are based primarily on expected water elevations using the FASTER
methodology. Zone 1 is intended to be used for events with expected FASTER water
elevations of less than 1 m above mean sea level and is descriptive (i.e., no definitive
spatial boundary), calling for evacuation of beaches, harbor docks, and piers (stars in
Fig. 1). Zone 2 would be recommended for tsunamis with FASTER water elevations of
1.0–1.5 m and only affects Alameda Island. No Bay Farm Island shoreline is expected to
be inundated in a Zone 2 evacuation, although the ferry terminal on Bay Farm Island would
be encouraged to evacuate (as it would with a Zone 1 evacuation). Zone 3 relates to
FASTER water elevations of 1.5–2.5 m, affecting both Alameda and Bay Farm Islands
with areas on both islands for evacuees to seek safety.
As previously mentioned, the Alameda playbook recommends a Maximum Zone
evacuation (Fig. 1) for tsunamis that are expected to arrive with less than 4 h which
includes large earthquakes associated with the Cascadia or Alaska subduction zones. Four
hours is not considered enough time for emergency managers to assess impending tsunami
characteristics, run a FASTER calculation, and recommend an evacuation zone. Tsunamis
originating from the Cascadia and Alaska–Aleutian Islands subduction zones are expected
to arrive within 1 and 4–5 h, respectively. In addition, earthquake source modeling sug-
gests that several local sources could produce tsunamis that reach Alameda shores in
10–15 min. The Maximum Zone affects both Alameda and Bay Farm Island. Alameda
Island has interior areas that could provide refuge, whereas a Maximum Zone evacuation
for Bay Farm Island would require complete evacuation.
3.2 Pedestrian evacuation potential
Pedestrian travel times were mapped using an anisotropic, path distance, geospatial model
implemented within ArcMap 10.2 software that focuses on the slope and land cover of an
area to calculate the most efficient paths on foot to safety from every location in the
Alameda evacuation zones (Wood and Schmidtlein 2012; Jones et al. 2014). Difficulty of
traveling through each location is represented as a cost in terms of increased travel time.
Anisotropy incorporates direction of travel, and path distance calculates distances and
slopes between cells of varying elevations. Land cover and elevation-derived slope data are
transformed into speed conservation values (SCVs) and represent the proportion of max-
imum travel speeds that are expected on areas with given conditions. Slope SCVs are based
on Tobler’s hiking function (Tobler 1993), and slopes were derived from 1-m resolution
elevation data (A. Foxgrover, USGS Pacific Coastal Marine Science Center, personal
communication, January 26, 2015).
Land cover SCVs are based on Soule and Goldman’s (1972) energy cost terrain coef-
ficients for certain land cover types, and geospatial land cover data were developed from a
manual classification of the most recent Google Earth imagery and Google Maps street
view, as well as supplemental geospatial data. A buildings footprint shapefile supplied by
the City of Alameda (E. Smith, personal communication, November 6, 2014) was updated
to reflect recent residential and commercial developments, as well as house demolitions on
the Alameda NAS. Fences were digitized using the most recent Google Earth imagery and
Google Maps street view with an emphasis on identifying very large fenced areas (e.g.,
golf courses or airports). Additional geospatial data to delineate land cover include wetland
data from the National Wetland Inventory (US Fish and Wildlife Service 2015); water
bodies from the National Hydrography Dataset (US Geological Survey 2015); and streets
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(Alameda County, CA 2014). The high residential density and numerous fences separating
properties across Alameda suggest that pedestrian evacuations will be limited to paved
surfaces (i.e., streets and parking lots). To limit pedestrian travel to paved surfaces, we
used geospatial data delineating tax parcel boundaries (Alameda County, CA 2014) and
related land use code data (Alameda County Data Sharing Initiative 2014) to identify
residential parcels, which were then treated as pedestrian barriers in the model.
Travel cost surfaces that integrate land cover and slope variability are converted to maps
of pedestrian travel times using a travel speed assumption of 1.22 m s-1 (Jones et al.
2014). This average walk assumption was chosen to reflect the mixed population of
varying mobility, as well as the potential for slowing due to fatigue. Evacuation modeling
also assumes instantaneous evacuations and does not incorporate evacuation delays.
3.3 Population exposure
Several datasets were assembled to estimate the number of people in the various Alameda
evacuation zones. Residential estimates were created by distributing population counts in
2010 Census block data (US Census Bureau 2014a, b) to residential parcel centroids
(Alameda County, CA 2014) using a spatial join and a ratio of point density per block
within ArcMap 10.2. This method is not meant to associate an exact location of residents to
parcels, but rather a topology to evenly apply census population within evacuation zone
boundaries using tools available. Demographic factors, such as age, ethnicity, and tenancy,
can amplify an individual’s sensitivity to hazards and reduce their ability to respond
(Cutter et al. 2003; Heinz Center 2002). For the residents in the evacuation zones, we
inventoried demographic attributes available at the census block level and related to eth-
nicity (Hispanic or Latino), race (American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Black or
African American, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander, and White), age (indi-
viduals under five and over 65 years in age), gender with particular family structures
(female-headed households with children under 18 years of age and no spouse present),
and tenancy (group quarters and renter-occupied households).
Business characteristics were developed using a 2011 version of the Infogroup
Employer Database (Infogroup 2011), which is a proprietary database that includes latitude
and longitude coordinates, employee counts, and type based on the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS). We used NAICS codes to classify certain busi-
nesses as community-support businesses (e.g., banks or credit unions, civil or social
organizations, gas stations, government offices, grocery stores, libraries, and religious
organizations), dependent-care facilities (e.g., child services, elderly services, medical
centers, and K-12 schools), critical facilities (e.g., fire stations, national security facilities,
electrical facilities, and airline companies), and public venues (e.g., museums, overnight
accommodations, and parks or other outdoor venues). In addition to spatial population
data, we also acquired beach visitor data and marine live-aboard numbers (D. Cuoco,
personal communication, November 20, 2014, and City of Alameda Planning and Building
Department 2014). The census does not report residents who are live-aboard boats;
therefore, manual identification and tabulation of docks was conducted using the most
recent Google Earth imagery. Each population layer was overlaid on the evacuation zones
and evacuation travel-time maps for each zone to estimate the number of individuals or
facilities in terms of travel time to reach a boundary of each evacuation playbook zone.
Our population analysis focuses solely on Alameda and Bay Farm Islands. Although
pedestrian evacuation modeling was completed for Coast Guard Island, we chose not to
include it in subsequent population analyses, given the exclusively federal nature of the
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development. The island is home to several major US Coast Guard commands and publicly
available information simply states that the island includes 700 housing units (United
States Coast Guard 2016). Any further population analysis on our part would be specu-
lative in nature, and ultimately, the Coast Guard would likely be implementing their own
evacuation procedures separate from city officials.
4 Results
The four evacuation zones for the City of Alameda contain approximately 43,385 resi-
dents, which is 59 % of the total population (Fig. 2). The evacuation zones also contain
approximately 13,708 employees at 1036 businesses representing 67 and 44 % of
employees and businesses in the City of Alameda (Fig. 2). In addition to the people that
live and work in the tsunami-evacuation zones, there are approximately 968 businesses
likely to have a substantial number of local customers (e.g., retail), 430 dependent-care
facilities (e.g., physician offices, schools, assisted living facilities), 69 public venues, and
14 critical facilities. In this section, we break down these numbers by evacuation zone and
island to discuss the intra-community implications of recommending evacuations of the
various zones on either island.
4.1 Evacuation Zone 1
Evacuation Zone 1 is recommended for tsunamis with expected water elevation (FASTER
value) of 0–1 m and focuses on the evacuation of beaches, piers, and harbor docks. In our
study area, it is confined to Alameda Island, except for one ferry terminal dock on Bay
Farm Island. Zone 1 is descriptive and is not defined by geospatial boundaries; therefore,
we discuss the number and distribution of docks and estimated population on these docks,
instead of conducting a geospatial analyses. Based on a manual interpretation of satellite
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Fig. 2 Cumulative a numbers and b percentages of residents, and c numbers and d percentages of
employees by evacuation playbook zone and island
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shipping, or coast guard vessels) in eight marinas and private docks along the Alameda
coast (Table 1). According to regulations described by the City of Alameda Planning and
Building Department (2014), approximately 10 % of a marina’s docks may be permitted as
live aboard, which suggests that 340 docks (including 41 house boats) potentially are being
used as homes (Table 1). Many marinas also allow temporary overnight stays on vessels
that have overnight permits but do not keep accurate counts (B. de Lappe, Alameda Marina
Harbor Master, personal communication, 2014).
Another area that would be evacuated during a Zone 1 evacuation is Robert W. Crown
Memorial State Beach (Fig. 1), which is the only beach in the study area and attracts a
substantial number of visitors. According to ongoing visitor attendance research conducted
by the East Bay Regional Park District, average yearly attendance between 2004 and 2013
was approximately 484,223 people (D. Cuoco, personal communication, November 20,
2014). Assuming an equal distribution of visitors throughout the year, the beach receives
approximately 1327 daily beach visitors on average. Actual daily attendance at this state
beach is likely even greater on certain days because beach attendance is not uniform
throughout the year. In a study of annual beach attendance of 75 southern California
beaches in 2007, Dwight et al. (2007) conclude that 53 % of all visits occurred in summer
months and that 48 % of all visits throughout the year occurred on weekends (27 % on
Saturdays and 21 % on Sundays). Therefore, after accounting for this variability in beach
attendance and using these percentages, the number of visitors to Robert W. Crown
Memorial State Beach is estimated to range from 288 visitors on a Tuesday in February to
6514 visitors on a Saturday in July. While Dwight et al. (2007) are based on southern
California beach attendance and visitors may have been double counted, estimates are
meant to provide some context as to the visitor fluctuations which could be impacted
during a tsunami.
Table 1 Alameda Island boat dock and live-aboard estimates and approximate maximum estimated
pedestrian travel times, by marina and evacuation playbook zone
Marina Live-aboard permitsa Dock count Maximum pedestrian travel time
(min)
Zone 2 Zone 3 Maximum Zone
Marina Village 95 953 4 18 25
Grand Avenue Marina 38 367 6 12 13
Alameda Marina 53 530 4 5 7
Fortman Marina 50 497 3 13 13
Ballena Isle Marina 50 500 4 18 18
Aeolian Marina 9 85 4 12 12
Barnhill Marinab 41 61 3 12 28
Mariner Square 4 38 4 14 30
Private docks n/a 209c n/a n/a n/a
Total 340 3240 n/a n/a n/a
Mean maximum travel time n/a n/a 4 13 18.25
a Potential live-aboard permits, unverified
b 41 houseboats and 20 small boat docks
c No live aboards, docks are attached to homes
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Pedestrian evacuation modeling could not be conducted for the various beaches, piers,
and harbor docks because Zone 1 is descriptive and is not delineated by geospatial
boundaries. However, previous work on pedestrian evacuation modeling to evacuate docks
before tsunami wave arrival in Alaskan coastal communities estimated clearance times of
10 min or less (Wood and Peters 2014). In our study area, estimated wave arrival times for
all of the distant tsunami sources are on the order of hours, indicating that evacuations
could be accomplished before wave arrival. Wave arrival times for local sources in Ala-
meda are estimated to be 10–15 min (Wilson and Miller 2015), suggesting that successful
evacuations from these events are likely during a Zone 1 evacuation unless the docks or
piers are damaged during the associated earthquake.
4.2 Evacuation Zone 2
A Zone 2 evacuation could be recommended for a tsunami with water elevation of 1.0–1.5
m. For the at-risk populations previously discussed in Zone 1 section, modeled clearance
times out of Zone 2 range from 1 min for beachgoers at Robert W. Crown Memorial State
Beach to 6 min for Grand Avenue Marina. Average minimum time to evacuate the various
marinas is 4 min (Table 1). Eleven minutes of evacuation travel time is expected to
evacuate from the end of the Alameda Ferry dock to safety outside of Zone 2 (Fig. 5).
In addition to transient populations on docks and beaches, we estimate that the Zone 2
evacuation area on Alameda Island contains approximately 204 residents and 350
employees (Fig. 2), as well as 22 community-support businesses, 4 public venues, 3
dependent-care facilities, and no critical facilities. Modeled clearance times out of this
evacuation zone are estimated to be 1–14 min (Figs. 3a, 4), suggesting that successful
evacuations are likely during a Zone 2 evacuation. The Zone 2 evacuation area on Bay
Farm Island contains no residences or businesses (Fig. 2).
4.3 Evacuation Zone 3
A Zone 3 evacuation in Alameda is recommended for distant tsunamis with estimated
arrival times of 4 h or more after an earthquake and expected water elevations of
1.5–2.5 m. Impacting both Alameda and Bay Farm Islands, the Zone 3 area adds
approximately 29,843 residents to an evacuation, representing the majority of residents in
the city’s evacuation zones (69 %), with 18,332 of them on Alameda Island (31 % of the
island’s population) and the other 11,511 residents on Bay Farm Island (85 % of the island)
(Fig. 2).
A Zone 3 evacuation also adds 11,695 employees at 822 businesses to an evacuation,
representing 85 % of all employees in the various zones and 57 % of the total workforce in
the City of Alameda. Sixty percent of the 11,695 employees are on Alameda Island. Bay
Farm Island has fewer employees in Zone 3 (4752 compared to 6943 on Alameda Island),
but they represent 99 % of the island’s workforce (the remaining 29 employees are found
in the Maximum Zone) (Fig. 2). Of the 822 businesses in the Zone 3 evacuation area, there
are 272 community-support businesses, 116 dependent-care facilities, 42 public venues,
and 6 critical facilities (Fig. 5).
The highest estimated evacuation travel times (60–74 min) were found where currently
no populations live or work on Alameda Point and near runways of Oakland Airport. Areas
where 45–59 min is likely needed to exit evacuation Zone 3 contain approximately 1234
Bay Farm Island employees, but no Alameda Island employees or residents on either island
(Figs. 3b, 4). This portion of the Zone 3 evacuation area also contains 5 businesses likely to
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have high customer counts, 2 dependent-care facilities, and 1 public venue. The majority of
residents (74 %) and employees (60 %) in the Zone 3 evacuation area are at locations
where modeled travel times are 1–14 min (Figs. 3b, 4). This trend also applies to the
community-support businesses (209 out of 272 in the Zone 3 evacuation area), critical




















































(b) Evacuation Zone 3
(c) Maximum Zone
Fig. 3 Maps of modeled pedestrian travel times in the City of Alameda, assuming a travel speed of 1.22 m/
s and evacuation playbook a Zone 2, b Zone 3 and c the Maximum Zone
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Fig. 5 Estimated travel times to
safety for various evacuation
zones on Alameda Island (AI)
and Bay Farm Island (BFI)
organized by business type
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facilities (4 of 6), dependent-care facilities (96 of 116), and public venues (20 of 29), in
which the majority of them are in areas where modeled travel times are less than 15 min
(Figs. 3b, 5). Seven dependent-care facilities on Alameda Island in this portion of the Zone
3 evacuation area are affiliated with adult-assistance services and likely have residents who
could require assistance evacuating and might need medical equipment and medication at a
shelter during an evacuation (Wood et al. 2013a).
The typical estimated evacuation travel time from marinas along the shore out of the
Zone 3 evacuation area is 13 min, with the highest amount of time (18 min) at Marina
Village and Ballena Isle Marina (Table 1). As discussed earlier, the actual travel time may
be longer for specific live-aboard residences given the time to exit a boat, as opposed to
already being on a dock. The approximate travel time from the shoreline out of Zone 3 is
22 min.
4.4 Maximum evacuation zone
Maximum Zone evacuations in Alameda will affect both islands (evacuates everyone from
Bay Farm Island) and could be implemented for both large local and distant source events.
Estimated wave arrival times are 10–15 min for local sources and 5 h or more for distant
sources, except for a Cascadia subduction zone earthquake scenario where tsunami waves
are expected within 1 h of ground shaking (Wilson and Miller 2015). The Maximum Zone
evacuation area adds approximately 13,338 residents to an evacuation, with 11,249 of them
on Alameda Island and the other 2089 residents on Bay Farm Island (Fig. 2). These
increases represent 19 and 15 % of the total population on Alameda Island and Bay Farm
Island, respectively. The Maximum Zone also adds approximately 1634 Alameda Island
employees (18 % of the island’s workforce) and 29 Bay Farm Island employees (1 % of
the island workforce) (Fig. 2). All of the additional 29 employees within the Maximum
Zone on Bay Farm Island are affiliated with an elementary school. Other businesses with
unique on-site populations that are added by a Maximum Zone evacuation include 50
community-support businesses (all on Alameda Island), 2 critical facilities (both on Ala-
meda Island), 56 dependent-care facilities (54 of them on Alameda Island), and 8 public
venues (all on Alameda Island).
Approximately 80 % of the 23,792 Alameda Island residents in the maximum evacu-
ation zone (i.e., encompassing all previous zones) are in areas where travel times to safety
are 1–14 min, whereas only 5 % of Bay Farm Island residents are in a similar situation
(Fig. 4). The remaining Alameda Island residents are primarily in areas where travel times
are 15–29 min (18 %) or 30–44 min (2 %). On Bay Farm Island, the majority of residents
are in areas where evacuations could take 30–44 min (57 %), with smaller percentages at
15–29 (35 %), 1–14 min (5 %), and 45–59 min (3 %). For the entire city, this translates to
57 % of all residents requiring less than 15 min to evacuate, 23 % at 15–29 min, 20 % at
30–44 min, and less than 1 % at 45–59 min (Figs. 3c, 4). Areas with the highest travel
times (60–74 min) found on Alameda Island are on Alameda Point where currently no
residents live or employees work but plans for developing this land are underway (Ala-
meda Point Info 2016). The average travel time out of the maximum evacuation zone for
all docks in the study area is 18 min, with the highest at Mariner Square (30 min)
(Table 1). Approximate travel time to safety for the state beach is 25 min.
The distribution of employees is similar to the residents in that most of them are in areas
that require 1–14 min (45 % of the city workforce) or 15–29 min (20 % of the workforce).
However, there are 3311 employees (24 %) that are in areas of Bay Farm Island that may
take 60–74 min to evacuate out of the Maximum Zone (Figs. 3c, 4). With regard to
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businesses with potentially unique on-site populations, there are 219 community-support
businesses and 138 dependent-care facilities in areas on Alameda Island where 1–14 min is
needed to evacuate the maximum evacuation zone. Areas requiring 15–29 min to evacuate
include 56 community-support businesses, 1 critical facility, 12 dependent-care facilities
(including 1 additional adult-assistance facility), and 13 public venues. One critical facility
(a fire-protection training facility) is an area where 30–44 min is needed to evacuate
(Figs. 3c, 5).
On Bay Farm Island, evacuation travel times for all businesses and facilities increase for
a Maximum Zone evacuation due to no remaining safe area on the island. For example,
travel time to safety for the 1 critical facility (an airline-related business) on Bay Farm
Island increases to 60–74 min. The only 2 additional facilities on Bay Farm Island that
could be impacted when transitioning from Zone 3 to the Maximum Zone are dependent-
care facilities (an elementary school and a day-care center) and are located in an area
where travel time to safety is estimated at 30–44 min (Figs. 3c, 5).
4.5 Demographic characteristics of residential evacuees
Information on demographic characteristics of residents who live in the tsunami-evacua-
tion zones can help emergency managers in their effort to implement realistic evacuation
procedures. Demographic data are available only for residential counts in US Census data
and not for employees, customers, or tourists; therefore, we limit our discussion here to
characteristics of residents in delineated evacuation zones. Because of the magnitude of
demographic characteristics found at the block level, we also limit our discussion to
variations in demographic attributes related to age, ethnicity, and tenancy that vary plus or
minus 5 % of the City of Alameda average. As discussed earlier, the number of residents in
evacuation Zone 2 on Alameda Island is relatively low (204) (Fig. 2). Comparing demo-
graphic characteristics of residents in this zone to all residents in the City of Alameda, the
at-risk population in Zone 2 has a slightly higher percentage of individuals that identify
themselves as Hispanic or Latino, White, Black or African American, and female-headed
households with children and no husband present (Fig. 6). Zone 2 also has a substantially
higher percentage of residents in renter-occupied households and a substantially lower
percentage of Asian Americans. As more residents of Alameda Island are asked to evac-
uate in Zone 3 and the Maximum Zone, the demographic characteristics of the evacuee
population becomes similar to the city wide percentages. This is not the case, however, on
Bay Farm Island, where the evacuee populations in Zone 3 and the Maximum Zone have
higher percentages of residents that identify themselves as Asian, but lower percentages of
Hispanic or Latino, White, Black or African American, female-headed households with
children and no husband present, and renter-occupied households (Fig. 6).
5 Discussion
Tsunami-evacuation planning is a difficult task for coastal jurisdiction emergency man-
agers due to the range of potential tsunami sources, tidal influences, wave arrival times,
and extents of inundation. Although evacuation zones based on maximum inundation from
a variety of sources can help identify the highest number of individuals who could be
directly impacted by any tsunami, these zones may also lead to over-evacuations, extended
business disruption, and public distrust in evacuation practices for lower level, more
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frequently experienced events. In this paper, we explored the potential evacuation impli-
cations of using multiple tsunami-evacuation zones (playbooks) and focusing on the City
of Alameda, which recently has developed a series of evacuation zones based on the
severity of an impending tsunami. In this section, we discuss the implications of our results
on evacuation planning and the challenges faced by emergency managers when they must
act in the absence of perfect information, the potential strategies to mitigate these chal-
lenges, and suggested future research based on our results.
Results suggest substantial variations in the number and type of evacuees in the various
evacuation zones. Evacuation Zone 1 in our study area covers a state beach, 8 marinas, 2
ferry terminals, an aircraft carrier museum, and numerous private docks; therefore,
evacuees are primarily residents who are live-aboard boats, beachgoers, tourists, and
boating enthusiasts. These populations likely fluctuate (daily, weekly, and seasonally) and
may include people who do not normally live in tsunami-prone areas. As such, they may
not have high awareness of tsunami hazards or of what to do during an evacuation.
Daytime tsunamis resulting in an evacuation of Zone 1 will likely have greater impacts
than nighttime events, given the tourism-based populations in this zone. The one exception
is people living on boats in marinas. Given the transient nature of at-risk individuals in
evacuation Zone 1, education and outreach strategies could include signage; kiosks with
evacuation guidance; protocols for the maritime community (Wilson et al. 2016), dock
lease holders, or live-aboard residents; and evacuation exercises. Developing Emergency
Operations Plans incorporating tsunami-evacuation planning, as well as testing and
implementing them when needed, will serve as the foundation for evacuating an educated
populace. Modeling results suggest that populations at the beach and docks will likely have
more than adequate time to reach safety before the first wave in a tsunami arrives; how-
ever, this is based on the assumption that at-risk individuals initiate self-protective actions
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Fig. 6 Demographic characteristics of residents in the various evacuation zones, showing only
demographic percentages that varied more than 5 % of city averages
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If emergency managers extend an evacuation to include Zone 2, our results indicate a
low number of additional residents (204) and employees (350) will be added to those from
Zone 1 on Alameda Island and no additional people on Bay Farm Island (Fig. 2). Zone 2
also adds 22 retail businesses, 4 public venues, a medical clinic, and 2 child-care centers
(Fig. 5) to an evacuation, and while these sites will contribute to the number of evacuees,
their potential loss would not impact the execution of emergency response efforts like the
loss of a police or fire station could. Unlike transient populations in Zone 1, resident and
business addresses within Zone 2 could be targeted for tsunami awareness and evacuation
outreach. Estimated travel times indicate evacuees should have sufficient time to travel
outside of Zone 2 on foot before the arrival of the first tsunami wave. Demographic
analysis of individuals in Zone 2 suggests that evacuation-education efforts should be
developed and implemented in ways to best reach the relatively high concentration of
renters (Fig. 6).
The largest increase in residential and employee evacuee populations occurs with the
decision to call a Zone 3 evacuation. Our results indicate that a Zone 3 evacuation would
add tens of thousands of people beyond that already involved in either a Zones 1 or 2
evacuation, representing the majority of the at-risk population in our study area. As was the
case with businesses in Zone 2, none of the 822 businesses or facilities in Zone 3 are
critical facilities such as police or fire stations that, if lost, would impact an evacuation
(Fig. 5). There are, however, many businesses and offices that when closed for an evac-
uation could greatly impact those businesses and the quality of life of non-evacuating
residents, including banks (4), government offices (15), libraries (2), markets (5), K-12
schools (9), child day-care centers (6), medical offices (92), and adult-residential-care
centers (6). The various dependent-care facilities (e.g., schools, child day-care centers, and
adult-residential-care centers) in Zone 3 suggest that evacuating some at-risk individuals
may be more difficult than the general public. Another potential issue that complicates an
evacuation is parents entering the evacuation zone to retrieve their children from schools
and day-care centers, as well as relatives or friends picking up residents who live in adult-
residential-care centers. One mitigating factor is that potential sources associated with a
Zone 3 evacuation are likely distant earthquakes only and expected tsunami arrival times of
4 h or more should provide sufficient time to implement a successful evacuation before
wave arrival. Given the long wave arrival time and relatively shorter evacuation-clearance
times (Fig. 3b), the challenge for emergency managers during a Zone 3 evacuation may be
less of the threat of life loss but more of how to mobilize, guide, and potentially provide
sheltering services for the large populations expected to evacuate. However, areas of Zone
3 would be expected to evacuate during a Maximum Zone evacuation which may include
local and regional sources where evacuation-clearance times may be relatively short.
A related aspect of guiding at-risk individuals to safety is the conditions at identified
safe areas. While at-risk individuals in a Zone 3 evacuation on Alameda Island can be
dispersed to a large area of the island’s interior, individuals on Bay Farm Island are
theoretically moving to a substantially smaller area on the northwest side of the island
(Fig. 3b). Given the area of this predicted safe zone and the number of at-risk individuals
on the island, the resulting population density during an evacuation would be approxi-
mately 22,192 persons per sq km, which is over ten times the pre-tsunami population
density on Bay Farm (2091 persons per sq km) and over three times the population density
of nearby San Francisco (approximately 6632 persons per sq km) (US Census Bureau
2015). Therefore, follow-up studies on alternative evacuation planning or the ability for
these safe areas to accommodate such high numbers of evacuees, including consideration
of appropriate and adequately engineered vertical evacuation structures, may be warranted.
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Implementing an evacuation to the Maximum Zone adds fewer people to the evacuation
than a Zones 2–3 transition (13,338 residents, which is 44 % of the Zone 3 addition). The
number of businesses in the Maximum Zone and not in smaller zones is also less (150
compared to 822) but could have a similar effect on business disruption or quality of life
(e.g., retail, medical offices, banks, markets, schools) (Fig. 5). One new complication to a
Maximum Zone evacuation is the addition of a medical center on Alameda Island, which
may have difficulty evacuating all patients in a timely fashion (Wood et al. 2013b). Plans
for developing Alameda Point could add another complication to a Maximum Zone
evacuation by potentially increasing the number of residents and employees where the
longest estimated travel times to safety were found. Consideration of the tsunami-
evacuation playbook zones by planners of new developments in Alameda could be useful
for decision making.
Although a Maximum Zone evacuation may not introduce as many new evacuees as
Zone 3 could, it does introduce new issues of clearance time, evacuee destinations, and
public perception of the threat. A comparison of wave arrival times for local sources
associated with the Maximum Zone (Table 1), maps of modeled pedestrian clearance time
(Fig. 2), and graphs of population exposure as a function of travel time to safety (Figs. 4,
5) suggest that there are thousands of residents and employees, as well as hundreds of
businesses, in areas where people would not have enough time to evacuate the Maximum
Zone before wave arrival. Table 1 summarizes several local-source scenarios with esti-
mated 10- to 15-min wave arrivals and a Cascadia, full-rupture scenario (M9.0) with an
estimated 1-h wave arrival, but evacuation travel times are greater than that in many parts
of the study area (Fig. 3).
In reality, the evacuation situation is not as dire as it may seem for many at-risk
individuals in these scenarios and it highlights a challenge of emergency managers related
to communicating short arrival tsunami threats to the public. Recommendations for
evacuating smaller zones in Alameda (e.g., Zones 1–3) are based solely on distant source
events with wave arrival times of 4 h or more because emergency managers likely would
have sufficient time to determine the extent of an imminent tsunami threat and commu-
nicate evacuation guidance to at-risk populations. Evacuation of the Maximum Zone,
however, may be implemented by a mix of distant events with wave arrival times ranging
from 1 to 5 h and local sources with arrival times of 10–15 min. In some cases, the
decision to implement a Maximum Zone evacuation for a distant source reflects high
expected water elevations (e.g., Alaska–Aleutian Island source scenarios). Modeling
results suggest that everyone in areas of the Maximum Zone would have sufficient time to
evacuate in the 5 h before expected wave arrival from these sources, as long as delays and
complications do not arise.
Some local and regional tsunami source scenarios associated with a Maximum Zone
have expected water elevation values that are more reflective of a Zone 1 evacuation (e.g.,
0–1 m expected water elevation) or Zone 2 evacuation (e.g., 1.0–1.5 m expected water
elevation) (Wilson and Miller 2015). However, wave arrival times are on the order of
10–15 min for the various large local-source events and 1 h for a large Cascadia earth-
quake. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for tsunami modelers to thoroughly assess an
impending tsunami and confidently communicate playbook parameters (including FAS-
TER and a zone recommendation) to local emergency managers in the limited time before
waves arrive. These short arrival times have led local and state emergency managers to be
risk averse and therefore recommend Maximum Zone evacuations for these events as an
attempt to move evacuees as far from the shoreline as possible, even though water ele-
vation is unlikely to reach the full extent of the Maximum Zone. Recognizing this
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distinction, one can see in Fig. 3b that all areas in evacuation Zone 2 can be evacuated in
less than 15 min. Therefore, at-risk individuals will likely have sufficient time to evacuate
out of the truly high risk areas of Zone 2 for these scenarios, even though individuals may
not feel it is possible given the extent of the Maximum Zone that may be communicated in
outreach. Additionally, if emergency managers felt confident in calling a Zone 2 evacu-
ation for a local or Cascadia sourced tsunami, no one would be asked to leave Bay Farm
Island.
Emergency managers therefore have to wrestle with competing evacuation challenges.
With the current procedures of evacuating the Maximum Zone for local or Cascadia
sources, emergency managers run the risk over-evacuating thousands of people due to
insufficient time to validate attributes of an impending tsunami in order to be confident in
communicating evacuation of smaller zones (e.g., Zones 1–3). If they attempted to rec-
ommend evacuation orders for smaller zones for these same scenarios in outreach efforts,
they run the risk of under-evacuating thousands of people because at-risk individuals may
wait for evacuation orders, significantly reducing the amount of available time for an
evacuation. An appropriate compromise may be in retaining the recommendation to
evacuate to the Maximum Zone, but with the understanding that lower water elevations
may be expected for these local sources. In the future, emergency managers may be able to
modify evacuation procedures for these short arrival events as communication technology
and dynamic inundation modeling continue to improve. In the short term, emergency
managers may have to contend with public perceptions of over-evacuations for certain
types of tsunamis. More research exploring the willingness of the public to learn tsunami
information or participate in outreach efforts, as well as understanding past public reactions
to over-evacuation, is warranted.
One challenge when implementing a Maximum Zone evacuation for Bay Farm Island is
that at-risk individuals will be asked to evacuate completely off of the island and may
choose to travel east out of the City of Alameda to the Oakland mainland (Figs. 1, 3c). This
raises the issue of having to coordinate evacuation policies and protocols among neigh-
boring communities. Although evacuation planning is typically handled by internal com-
munity planning, our results indicate that evacuees traveling from the Maximum Zone on
Bay Farm Island may need to seek safety within neighboring jurisdictions. The pre-tsunami
coordination of evacuation procedures, assembly areas, and evacuee services between
jurisdictions could minimize any potential confusion during an event.
Additional challenges in implementing a Maximum Zone evacuation on Bay Farm
Island are the long distances and large fenced areas (e.g., golf course and Oakland airport
in Fig. 1) along the primary routes. Two evacuation scenarios could result from evacuees
thinking safety is too far in neighboring Oakland. Many Bay Farm Island evacuees may try
and evacuate to Alameda Island across the one connected bridge (Fig. 1), instead of
traveling east to Oakland. If all at-risk residents on Bay Farm Island did this and joined the
Alameda Island evacuees and existing residents in this area, the population density of that
area could reach approximately 13,745 persons per square km, which is two times the
population density of nearby San Francisco. These increases in population density repre-
sent challenges for emergency managers when deciding whether to keep their evacuation
contained within their city limits or to partner with surrounding jurisdictions and poten-
tially relieve some of the density.
Another evacuation scenario for Bay Farm Island residents not wishing to walk the long
distance to nearby Oakland is the use of vehicles during the evacuation. The relatively long
expected arrival times for the distant tsunami sources (1 or more hours) may lead at-risk
individuals to believe that there is enough time to prepare and evacuate by vehicle. It can
992 Nat Hazards (2016) 84:975–995
123
be counterintuitive to think that traveling by foot could move at-risk populations out of
tsunami zones faster than vehicles, but limited egress points for vehicles off of Bay Farm
Island suggest that congestion could disrupt the flow of evacuating vehicles. Traffic sim-
ulation modeling of Bay Farm Island populations traveling off the island in vehicles may
be warranted to understand whether this method of evacuation could be successful during a
tsunami event and if not, the communication strategies to discourage vehicular
evacuations.
6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to examine the population and evacuation implications for
multi-zone evacuation planning summarized in tsunami-evacuation playbooks for coastal
communities along the California coast. We calculated population magnitudes and
pedestrian travel times to safety for the various evacuation zones in Alameda, California, to
help emergency managers better understand the evacuation context of each zone. Based on
our case study of Alameda, we reach several conclusions that bear on tsunami-evacuation
planning in coastal communities.
• Evacuation modeling suggests that at-risk populations should have sufficient time to
reach safety before estimated wave arrival for each evacuation zone; however, the
magnitude and types of evacuees vary from beach visitors and boaters in Zone 1 to over
43,000 mixed populations in the Maximum Zone.
• Implementing the FASTER approach and playbook-type evacuation plans for distant
source events (greater than 4 h travel time) may provide safe and consistent secondary
options for emergency managers that are still conservative but better match the amount
of potential flooding considering the tsunami and tidal conditions. This approach could
also greatly reduce the number of evacuees below a Maximum Zone evacuation,
especially between Zone 2 (204 residents) and Zone 3 (29,843 residents) evacuations in
Alameda.
• None of the 1306 business and offices in the various evacuation zones include critical
facilities that, if lost, would influence the ability of the city to implement evacuations,
but do include businesses and offices that could suffer disruptions and greatly impact
the quality of life within communities, including banks, government offices, libraries,
markets, K-12 schools, child day-care centers, medical offices, and adult-residential-
care centers.
• Identified safe areas may not be able to accommodate the expected evacuee population,
as results suggest very high population densities in these areas after an evacuation.
Adequate refuge exists at the center of Alameda Island.
• Evacuees, especially for Bay Farm Island, may need to evacuate and find shelter in
neighboring jurisdictions, which highlights the need for multi-jurisdictional evacuation
planning coordination.
• Implementing a Maximum Zone evacuation is currently recommended by the Alameda
Tsunami Evacuation Playbook for local and Cascadia tsunami sources given the limited
amount of available time to assess tsunami attributes and communicate recommen-
dations for smaller zones. This approach, however, may also result in an over-
evacuation and the public may perceive successful evacuations as not possible given
the longer pedestrian travel times required to completely evacuate the Maximum Zone.
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This issue could also result in individuals thinking that car-based evacuations are the
solution; yet, traffic congestion could hamper evacuations.
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